Effectiveness of 4p’s in Terms of Mch and Education Essay

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are among the most popular social protection schemes today. Promoted by multilateral institutions, notably the World Bank, CCTs have been adopted in at least 30 countries as of 2008, with further ones expected to follow suit in the coming years (WB‘s CCT Webpage). The map below shows these country-adopters. CCTs are grounded on the principle that human capital accumulation is a development vehicle which can be achieved by providing money to poor households, often to women, on conditions that they ensure children‘s regular attendance in school, accompany them to health clinics, and participate in classes and workshops on topics related to health, nutrition, and sanitation (St. Claire 2009: 177; Bradshaw 2008: 188; Hall 2006: 691). Citing the experiences of Latin American countries, particularly Mexico and Brazil, advocates have repeatedly claimed that CCTs are an effective and efficient means of reducing poverty and hunger, keeping childre n in school, enhancing the use of preventive healthcare, empowering women, and increasing the freedom of poor households to invest in their varied needs (WB‘s CCT Webpage; ECLAC 2004). No wonder, with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) deadline getting near, CCTs have been in vogue in a number of countries, including that archipelagic country in the east—the Philippines. In view of the worsening poverty situation and the MDG targets, the Philippine government ran a pilot CCT project in 2007, targeting 6,000 poor households in two provinces and two cities. It proceeded to implementing a full-scale program in 2008, calling it Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) and targeting 320,000 additional households. When Benigno Aquino III was elected president in 2010, he decided to sustain his predecessor‘s 4Ps, and further expand its coverage so that when he bows out of the presidency in 2016, it will have reached a total of 4.3 million households (PCIJ 2011). Quoting the Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016, CCTs are the ―cornerstoneâ€â€" upon which the government ―has anchored [the] epic battle against poverty in the landâ€â€" (ibid.). This research has avoided the usual route of scrutinizing the implementation and (non)impact of CCTs in particular, and of development programs in general. It has taken one step back, and examined the factors that influenced or helped shape the government‘s decision to adopt CCTs in a country marked by a long history of poverty and inequality, and was once described as the Latin America in Asia1. The interest on this topic grew out of the observation of the government‘s continued adherence to the so-called residual type of social policy and social provision despite the lessons learned from and the criticisms hurled at past and on-going initiatives. It is in fact worth noting that the 4Ps which of late is called Pantawid Pamilya, is just one of the targeted and pallia tive poverty reduction measures pursued in the country. An earlier one, and internationally acclaimed at that, is the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (Linking Arms Against Poverty) or KALAHI which has been the flagship poverty reduction program since 2003. A critical review of the KALAHI program reveals that its overall intervention does not offer a more permanent and effective way out of poverty because it lacks coherent plans and mutually supporting projects; and that its social protection component is neither broadly implemented nor viewed to provide permanent economic opportunities for the poor to accumulate assets and to engage in permanent income generating activities (Lim 2009: 29). An assessment of the Philippines‘ performance vis-à  -vis the MDGs supports this analysis. It stresses that†¦ Social protection in the Philippines is not universal; it is simply a bundle of safety net measures targeted at the poorest of the poor. It is [neither] a rights-based entitlement for all citizens†¦[nor a determined effort to] address the structural causes of poverty†¦Since it only targets the ―poorest of the poorâ€â€", many poor remained excluded from the government‘s anti-poverty programs. (Serrano in S ocial Watch Philippines 2010: 23) The analytical position adopted here is that ―policy choices are very politicalâ€â€" no matter how they are couched in technocratic jargon and touted as neutral (Fischer 2010: 40). As further explained, ―social policies are the outcomes of political bargains and conflicts since they touch upon power in society—its distribution and accessibility to different political actorsâ€â€" (Mkandawire 2004: 11 and 12). It is therefore imperative to unravel the interplay of different political processes, institutions, and actors, along with their diverse agenda and ideological persuasions in order to gain a better understanding of social policy choices. This research posits that the Philippine government‘s decision to adopt CCTs reflects the unchanged social policy trajectory marked by the tendency towards targeted, palliative, and supposedly apolitical social provision, not to mention externally-influenced, drawing ―encouragementâ€â€" and support from multilateral institutions, all at the expense of structural reform and redistribution (i.e., asset reform, employment creation, recall of unfair international trade rules and agreements). This trajectory has been defined by the interaction of various political institutions, also called ―the rules of the gameâ€â€", as well as actors, notably the elites whose longstanding dominance in the political and economic arenas has compelled and enabled them to suppress or overturn reform efforts that threaten their position and hold of power. That being said, CCTs paint a bleak picture for the long-term solution to poverty and inequality in the country mainly because like many other World Bank/multilateral donor-backed initiatives, they preclude rationalizing and confronting the structural roots of these problems. Framed in a way that appeals to the elites, middle class, masses, policymakers, bureaucrats, academics, and even a number of progressives—a program that addresses the laziness of the poor by requiring them to do something in exchange for some amount; a program that invests in the well-being of children; a program that efficiently uses the limited resources of government; a program that is supposedly ―apoliticalâ€â€", ―neutralâ€â€", or ―non-partisanâ€â€" and thus effectively reduces the likelihood of manipulation by politicos—a broad agreement of outright support for Pantawid Pamilya has been created despite warnings that it may only serve the Washington Consensus agenda of limiting the state, leaving the market to take care of income and welfare distribution, and granting mere safety nets to people who lose out in the process. Pantawid Pamilya is nothing but a continuation of the purportedly apolitical social policy of the country, and as such, runs the risk of obstructing government and society from going beyond palliatives and undertaking the untidy process of structural reform and distribution. With a situation like this, it is not to be expected that the program will catalyze the shift towards a redistributive and/or universal social provision. UNDP‘s Human Development Reports Webpage The Philippines is a country in the Southeast Asia in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. Its population based on the 2007 census is 88.5 million, of which 44.8 are males and 43.8 are females. Its average population growth rate as of that same year is 2.04 which registers a .32 decrease from 2000‘s 2.36. (NSO Website) Based on World Bank records, the growth in the country has been averaging around five percent over the last 10 years, except in 2010, where it has reached 7.6 percent, the highest in 30 years. Despite this positive picture, however, poverty continues to plague the country, while inequality remains a huge obstacle in achieving major strides in poverty reduction. The 2009 Official Poverty Statistics, the latest poverty report of the National Statistical Coordination Board, reveals that poverty incidence among the population has declined from 33.1 percent in 1991 to 24.9 percent in 2003, 26.4 in 2006, and 26.5 in 2009. Nevertheless, there still remains more than a quarter of the population, or roughly 23.14 million Filipinos livening in poverty. As for subsistence incidence among the population, the figures have decreased from 16.5 percent in 1991 to 11.1 in 2003, 11.7 in 2006, and 10.8 in 2006. As often the case, the official report differs from the unofficial report, especially if the bases are the perceptions of the poor themselves. Based on the survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations, self-rated poverty has ranged from 46 to 72 percent between 1991 and 2009. These numbers are obviously way about the official estimates. Within that period, overall self-rated hunger has averaged at 13.3 percent, of which moderate hunger has roughly been 9.8 percent, and severe hunger, 3.4 percent. Moderate hunger is when a family went hungry at least once in the last three months, while severe hunger is when a family often went hungry in the last three months. (SWS‘ Social Weather Indicators Webpage ) Inequality has shown a downward trend, but despite this decreasing gini ratio—from 0.4605 in 2003 to 0.4580 in 2006 to 0.4484 in 2009—it is still highest among the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (UNDP as cited in NSCB 2011: 8). For instance, for the year 2009, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam recorded a gini ratio of 0.394, 0.425, and 0.378, respectively (ibid.). In terms of the Human Development Indicators, on one hand, the country‘s performance has been promising. Its score has consistently increased from 0.550 in 1980 to 0.571 in 1990, 0.602 in 2000, 0.641 in 2010, and 0.644 in 2011, although these are still below the global and the East Asia and the Pacific averages (UNDP‘s Human Development Reports Webpage). – 5 – It is also important to take into account the spatial dimension of poverty. The regions with highest poverty incidence by families are the Caraga Region (39.8%) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (38.1%), while those with highest number of poor families are Central Visayas (415,303) and Bicol (385,338). The regions with highest subsistence incidence are the Zamboanga Peninsula (18.6%) and Northern Mindanao (15.6%), while those with the highest number of subsistence poor families are Central Visayas (181,649) and Bicol (137,527). Almost 40% of the income poor families are in Luzon, and 40% of the subsistence poor families are in Mindanao. (NSCB‘s 2009 Poverty Statistics Webpage) Moreover, majority of the poor are still located in the rural area with figures that have remained in the 70-percent-mark since 1985 based on the estimates of Balisacan (2006). (Emma_s_RP_Final_Draft_Nov_2011)