Essence Of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis

Essence Of finale Explaining The Cuban projectile CrisisEssence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, by graham flour Allison and Philip Zelikow examines the momentous Cuban Missile Crisis, which was one(a) of the most successful acts of diplomacy during the Cold War. Allison and Zelikow explore through collar different conceptual lenses accommodating the reader to look tho into rough-cut methods of unconnected constitution analysis. Allison and Zelikow evaluate the events of the thirteen days in October 1962 to award the pretendings of indemnity analysis from different perspectives. The authors provide ample historical reviews, tell and documents of the events, and offers thorough analyses of the crucial judgment of conviction of the nuclear age by withal applying new methods to consider with hostile insurance actions. The ternary conceptual illustrations, which stern be used to analyze form _or_ system of political science actions the Rational Actor, Organizational Behavior, and political Politics bewilders are described and applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis subject area. apiece model demonstrates different features and areas of the fundamental finishs made by both the united States and the Soviet Union during the crisis. Allison and Zelikow clarify that even though there is no whole fancying of the stain as it make ited at the time, and it lead neer be likely, however using these three theoretical lenses it will jock gain a foldr concord and more of an awareness of all of the elements and the options that were made at the time.In this essay I will tone-beginning to draw slightly understanding of the decisions the get together States made towards the Cuban Missile Crisis by using Allisons three conceptual lenses from the Essence of Decision, which is an analysis of the crisis itself and the decision making in the resolution procedure.Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow present Model I as the most commonly used method of evaluating foreign indemnity actions, this method is titled the Rational Actor Model, also enjoyn as RAM. RAM is a way of understanding policy actions taken by states, by considering the country as a sane unitary actor. The wise framework is also the most frequently used method in determining decisions between policy choices in the adoption and evaluation stages of the policy cycle. Whilst analysing an action undertaken by a state towards an new(prenominal) state, the RAM presumes the actions taken place are intended, value maximising and strategic. The authors quote for each rendering an act consists of showing what goal the judicature was pursing when it acted and how the action was a sensitive choice, pass offn the nations objective (Allison Zelikow, 1999, p. 15). This allows us to understand how people go well-nigh making decisions, as it is done implicitly, without the person unintentionally realising they are doing it. The of import questions in the Essen ce of Decision book that were answered in regards to the crisis are wherefore did the Soviet Union place offensive missiles in Cuba? Why did the US respond to this action with a blockade around Cuba? And why did the Soviet Union withdraw missiles in response? feel at the attitude in understanding the US decision-making reaction to the actions, the RAM analysis considers afterward evaluating a number options, and considering Kennedys goals, by assessing the quality of the search for options and their respective outcomes, and check into whether the final choice promised to achieve his original goals to the extent that the decision-making process comes close to this ideal model, we abide say that it was rational (Allison 1999, p.33), and a blockade would nonplus the best chance of sending the desired message to Moscow without elicit a array response. Allison and Zelikows Rational Actor Model, examines the question of whether we can understand clearly the move made by a countr y in the international policy arena as a rational choice? For instance, the concept of bounded rationality appears clearly in foreign policy decision making, even when there is a aboriginal decision noble of a state, for example a leader or president who has irresponsible choice everyplace all airs of action, their rational decision making will be hindered by the fact that they have no idea what the reverse is thinking. This can be referred back to the Cuban Missile Crisis where President Kennedy and his advisors, the ExComs failed attempts at trying to understand why Khrushchev made certain decisions and actions. Since the international policy arena often deals with competitive oppositional opponents who keep their true intentions hidden as a means of accomplishing what they want (Lindbolm, 1959, p.113-127). President Kennedy becomes the driver of the debate by making sure his team cautiously takes each step of the crisis to investigate deeper implications of each option and to stretch their imagination (Allison Zelikow, 1999, p. 357) as the mass of diverting nuclear war cascades upon him. Thus helps us understand why the US made a rational decision with the blockade as it had several advantages, one being it did not constitute direct attack, secondly it placed the burden of the next move on Khrushchev, and also unbroken other options open. This is when the USSR unconquerable to withdraw, that is because it recognised US strategic superiority. The book argues that in fact the USSR backed down in face of US warnings that further actions would follow if the missiles were to become operational.The second Model, Allison and Zelikow presents are the Organisational Model of foreign policy. In this model, it is understood that countries and governments are not unitary actors but are say as vast conglomerate(s) of loosely allied organisations, each with a square(p) action of its own (Allison Zelikow, 1999, p. 143). The authors state that Governments p erceive occupations through organisational sensorsthey define alternatives and forecast consequences as their component organisations. And process information So, the government movements are not so much logical choices decided upon by one central decision shake upr, but are the productions of galore(postnominal) organizations all functioning match to mensuration patterns of behaviour. The effects to consider with this organisational model deck that the importance of aspect at governmental actions this way gives us a clear understanding of why the United States made the decisions in this crisis. For example, nearly all government actions in foreign policy are carried out by organizations, whether it is the Forces or the CIA, in this case, the government carrying out the policies are divided with the military and discussion agencies. Furthermore, organizational actions are also limited and known by standard operating procedures, with what has been done before. The model whic h the authors present provides us with a risible opportunity to look at the role of bodies that play in foreign policy making in different ways. In Model II, Allison and Zelikow present a way of looking at policy decisions that are whole well ordered by the bureaucracy, although it may not be the government that makes the decision. In understanding the United States decision-making process with Model II, the deliberations of the EX-Com that produced possible alternatives were rather answered by the organisations, What specifically, could be done? (Allison Zelikow, 1999, p. 225). President Kennedys actions were limited by what the military organisations could do, since their actions and decisions made were backed up with experience and previous choices in foreign policy. Essence of Decision illustrates that organisational capacities are fundamental in international policy making. Model II also allows us to understand examples of how organizational behaviours totter the implement ation of certain policies. For example, the situation by the Soviet troops neediness of camouflage of the missiles in Cuba, and President Kennedy rushing to control with the test flights over Soviet air space. If this occurred after the crisis had begun, there might have started a nuclear war due to wrong interpretation other than a test flight. This example suggests that there is always more to the situation of a rational decision. The authors allow us to look through other lenses to give us more of an understanding of how the US made certain decisions end-to-end the crisis.The third model that Allison and Zelikow illustrate in the Essence of Decision is the governmental Politics model also known as the Bureaucratic model. Model III consists of policy actions as a process where state actors set out their personal thoughts, opinions and ideas together to achieve separate goals and decide upon a course of action collectively, which may conflict with each other. In Essence of Decisi on the authors explain why it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion (Allison Zelikow, 1999, p. 257). In this case, various individuals, working various organisational interests engage in a process to achieve a negotiated group decision, which will represent the policy of a state. During the Crisis all US decisions were created by ExCom, President Kennedys national circle of advisors that were composed together specifically for the missile crisis. Allison and Zelikow discussed the Ex-Com members and their ideas, the significance of the Cuban bring out to Kennedy, and generally try to illustrate an overall political aura behind the U.S. decisions. Allison proposed in the book that because of the failure of Bay of Pigs invasion, the Re frequentans in the United States intercourse made Cuban policy into a major issue for the upcoming congressional elections later in 1962. There fore President Kennedy decided on a strong response rather than a diplomatical one. Although the majority of ExCom initially favoured air strikes, those closest to the president, (his brother Attorney General, Robert Kennedy and spare Council General Theodore Sorensen) favoured the Blockade. At the same time Kennedy got himself into disputes with supporters of the air strikes, such(prenominal) as Force General Curtis Lemay. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy also distrusted the CIA and their advice. This combination of press and pull led to the implication of a blockade. (Essence of Decision Presentation, u.d) Because of the nature of many foreign policy decisions and the ultimate importance of the decisions they attempt to make, the public and congress can generally defer any decision-making authors to the president even if they know the situation. For instance, in Essence of Decision, we see that the president makes his decision very rapidly and through complete blankness, where there were no influence from Congress, or the public as they were unaware of the actions until the White House made the statements. Allison and Zelikow mention a few times in Essence of Decision how different the situation of the Missile Crisis would be if it had happened in todays world with the immense public intimacy forcing decisions within hours rather than days. As it was, the president only had to challenge with the challenger of ideas of his team of advisory. They brought in organizational and political thoughts from the head of agencies such as the military, which all had their own aims and objectives within the whole situation. As Wildavsky states, the president can nearly always gain support for his foreign policies, however his problem is to find a viable policy (1966, p. 237). For many parts of the government Kennedy had to perform, were very limited in comparison to the domestic policy situations that occur. This model in comparison to the first two models may not illustrate an informative policy analysis, however it does offer a strong case in understanding why Kennedy came to the decision of a blockade. With essentially no opinion from the populous, the small governmental group made their decisions that could have meant life or death of millions of people. Thank fully, the Cuban Missile Crisis was settled by USs decisions.Graham and Zelikows Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis helps us understand USs decision-making end-to-end the thirteen days by allowing us to look through three distinctive conceptual models. The three models shown throughout the book can be used to help understand policies at any level, from domestic to foreign. Looking into actions by governments through a rational, organisational and political lens seems necessary to fully understand the moves that Kennedy took and the game Khrushchev played. I believe we are used to winning a more full approach to accepting domestic and local anaesthetic po licy decisions because we are more alert of the aspects going into the decisions. This book helps us understand why Kennedy and ExCom made a rational decision after evaluating options ranging from doing nothing to a full invasion of Cuba, and then finally a blockade was selected because it wouldnt necessarily escalate into war, as well as forcing the Soviets to make the following move. The organisational process model allowed us to understand how Kennedy operated under time and information constraints whilst engaging in satisficing behaviour. Kennedy and Excom never really considered any other options besides the blockade or air strikes, and initially were almost solidly in favour of the air strikes. However, such attacks created huge doubt because of the US Air Force, as they could not guarantee it would disable all nuclear missiles. The blockade felt to be the safest option in that case. The bureaucratic political relation model also helped us understand Kennedy and ExComs differe nt level of power based on charisma, personality, skills of persuasion and personal ties to the head of the decision maker. level(p) whilst sharing the matching goals, the leaders contrast in how they accomplish it because of elements such as personal interests and background. These all have an impact on why the US made certain decision on choosing the blockade. This book constructs us to comprehend why international decisions are made, and helps simplify why rational reasons are behind certain actions. Applying the organisational process model and the governmental model to the foreign policy actions it gives us an insight to the possibilities of miscommunication, misunderstandings and disagreements that can also happen in such situations more than what we believed. Overall, Essence of Decision has helped to an extent with applicable information and evidence to support Allison and Zelikows three conceptual models, with an understanding of why the United States decided to choose th e blockade option.